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Cooperative NRDA & New
Governance
GETTING TO RESTORATION IN THE HUDSON
RIVER, THE GULF OF MEXICO, AND BEYOND
Michael B. Runnels†
Andrea Giampetro-Meyer‡
INTRODUCTION
In December 2010, General Electric Company (GE)
announced that it would proceed to Phase Two of a two-part
plan to remove toxic polychlorinated biphenyls, or PCBs, from
the Hudson River. The company had released the toxins into a
forty-mile stretch of the river over thirty years earlier.1 After
decades of fighting, GE finally decided to use its innovative
drive, technical expertise, and economic resources to clean and
restore the pollution’s damage.2
Less than a year earlier, and fifteen hundred miles
away, British Petroleum (BP) was making initial preparations
to respond to a massive oil spill. Starting in April 2010, the
spill yielded eighty-six days of nearly uncontrolled gushing.3
†
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1
Editorial, A Great Day for the River, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2010, at A22, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/28/opinion/28tue2.html [hereinafter Great Day].
2
Id.
3
For recent law review articles that analyze the Deepwater Horizon
disaster, see, for example, Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon
Blowout: There Ought to Be a Law, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (2010) (considering why three
laws—the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Outer Continental Shelf
Leasing Act (OCSLA), and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA)—failed “to prevent and cope
with the explosion of the drilling rig, Deepwater Horizon”). Houck highlights “the
power of negative thinking,” or worst-case analysis. Id. at 17-18; see also Sam Kalen et
al., Lingering Relevance of the Coastal Zone Management Act to Energy Development in
Our Nation’s Coastal Waters?, 24 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 73 (2010) (considering the role of the
states “to influence energy development occurring off their coasts” under the Coastal
Zone Management Act); Stanley A. Millan, Escaping the “Black Hole” in the Gulf, 24
TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 41 (2010) (“explor[ing] the reaches of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990,”
and how this law and state analogues address oil disasters and consequent damages).
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This disaster in the Gulf of Mexico made clear that while BP
had invested billions into sophisticated drilling technologies,4 it
had failed to invest in the technologies necessary to deal with
what ultimately became the largest oil spill in U.S. history—a
spill that continues to threaten marine life and adjacent
wetlands in the Gulf.5
Federal laws strive to hold polluters accountable. In
particular, Congress has enacted laws that make polluters liable
for the injury, destruction, or loss of natural resources resulting
from hazardous substances’ release into the environment. For
instance, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act6 (CERCLA, or Superfund7)
concerns waste sites, and the 1990 Oil Pollution Act8 (OPA)
For recent, more journalistic articles that anticipate the legal fallout from the
Deepwater Horizon spill, see, for example, Allison Torres Burtka, Ripple Effect, TRIAL,
Aug. 2010, at 42; Stephen Gidiere, Mike Freeman & Mary Samuels, The Coming Wave
of Gulf Coast Oil Spill Litigation, 71 ALA. LAW. 374 (2010).
4
Katie Howell, Oil Spill Containment, Cleanup Technology Has Failed to
Keep the Pace, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/04/30/
30greenwire-oil-spill-containment-cleanup-technology-has-f-95687.html.
5
See generally Carrie Presnall, Laura López-Hoffman & Marc L. Miller, Can
the Deepwater Horizon Trust Take Account of Ecosystem Services and Fund Restoration
of the Gulf?, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,129 (2010). Presnall, LópezHoffman, and Miller encourage Mr. Feinberg, administrator of the Deepwater Horizon
Oil Spill Trust and the Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF), “to account for ecosystem
services when assessing . . . harms,” and they describe strategies and mechanisms for
assessing harms. Id. at 11,130-31. “Ecosystem services are the benefits humans receive
from functioning ecosystems and the species that comprise them.” Id. at 11,130. These
services include “seafood, flood control, carbon sequestration, habitat for resident and
migrating wildlife, hunting, sport fishing, wildlife watching and other outdoor
recreation, a rich local culture, and more.” Id.
6
CERCLA provides for the cleanup of sites contaminated by hazardous
substances. It: (1) authorizes the federal government to clean up sites using the
Hazardous Substance Superfund, (2) imposes liability for cleanup on responsible
parties, (3) requires responsible parties to perform the cleanup and reimburse others or
the fund for the costs of cleanup, and (4) requires responsible parties to pay damages to
state and federal governments for injury to natural resources, including compensation
for destruction or loss. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2006).
7
For more information on the Superfund, see Kathleen Chandler Schmid,
The Depletion of the Superfund and Natural Resource Damages, 16 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
483 (2008) (explaining how the depletion of the Superfund has impacted CERCLA
remediation and describing how some states have created programs to recover natural
resource damages).
8
OPA imposes liability for removal costs and damages resulting from an
incident in which “oil is discharged . . . into . . . navigable waters or adjoining
shorelines or the exclusive economic zone.” 33 U.S.C. § 2701 (2006). Like CERCLA,
OPA establishes liability for damages for injuries, or loss of, natural resources, and
outlines liability limits in specific circumstances. Id. §§ 2701-2761.
For an article that explores some of the history of OPA, see Lawrence I.
Kiern, Liability, Compensation, and Financial Responsibility Under the Oil Pollution
Act of 1990: A Review of the First Decade, 24 TUL. MAR. L.J. 481 (2000) (critiquing
OPA, while recognizing the statute’s contribution to modern oil pollution law in the
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concerns oil spills. Both acts authorize a form of environmental
cleanup and restoration called natural resource damage
assessment (NRDA).9 NRDA is a legal process that determines
the type and degree of restoration in which a polluter must
engage to compensate the public for environmental pollution’s
harm to natural resources.10
The NRDA process is inherently adversarial. Companies—
often called Responsible Parties (RPs) or Potentially Responsible
Parties (PRPs)—represent the interests of their shareholders;
Natural Resource Trustees (Trustees) act on behalf of the public.
But each of these parties engages in NRDA with an eye toward
litigation under the assumption that the courts will ultimately
decide on required remedial action and compensation.
Neither CERCLA nor OPA requires cooperative NRDA,
a particular approach to NRDA that emphasizes the RPs’ and
Trustees’ need to join together and work toward the common
goal of restoring natural resources quickly and efficiently11—to
get to restoration.12 Three decades of adversarial Hudson River
cleanup and restoration efforts evidence a need for cooperative
NRDA approaches, the necessity of which is further
underscored by the work awaiting BP in the Gulf of Mexico.

United States); see also J. Terence Ryan, The Evolution of Natural Resource Damage
Assessments Under the Oil Pollution Act and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 29 (1994)
(providing a synopsis of CERCLA and OPA, description of methodologies used to
calculate penalties, and summary of judicial decision-making in the context of NRDA).
9
The federal Clean Water Act (CWA) and common law principles also
authorize NRDA. NRDA 101: FAQ’s, MISS. DEP’T OF ENVTL. QUALITY, NAT. RESOURCE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, http://www.mdeqnrda.com/faqs.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2011).
10
Id.
11
Bill Conner & Ron Gouguet, Getting to Restoration, ENVTL. F., May-June
2004, at 18, 22.
12
Id. at 19.
Companies are liable for restoring natural resource injuries beyond normal
cleanups under Superfund and the Oil Pollution Act. But they can cause their
financial exposure to skyrocket by instinctively using legal and scientific
defenses to avoid liability. Instead, industry can reduce costs and government
trustees can achieve restoration more quickly by joining together in a
cooperative natural resource damage assessment.
Id.; see also Carol A. Jones, Theodore D. Tomasi & Stephanie W. Fluke, Public and
Private Claims in Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 111
(1996) (promoting increased understanding of legal and economic principles that underlie
public and private NRDA claims under CERCLA and OPA); Jason R. Bentley, Note,
Examining the Role of Potentially Responsible Parties in Assessing Natural Resource
Damages, 23 VT. L. REV. 431 (1998) (urging potentially responsible parties—PRPs—
under CERCLA to be active participants in the NRDA process in an attempt to expedite
the process, reduce overall costs, and contribute to fair, equitable settlements).
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The purpose of this article is to examine NRDA’s
current shortcomings and recommend reforms to incentivize
cooperative NRDA and broader New Governance principles in
the future. This article proceeds in four parts. Part I delineates
the article’s theoretical underpinnings by placing cooperative
NRDA in the context of New Governance. New Governance is a
concept that encompasses various contemporary techniques of
law and regulation that foster cooperation among public and
private actors, including industries, corporate social
responsibility (CSR) advocates, and shareholders.13 Part II
considers the facts and relevant NRDA processes of two distinct
cases: GE’s release of PCBs into the Hudson River and the BP
oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Part III applies a particular New
Governance theory, Professor Edward M. Epstein’s model of
New Governance, to the GE and BP cases. Epstein’s model
highlights six modes of social control—law, affinity group
regulation, self-regulation, ethical precepts, the media, and an
13

New Governance, UNIV. WIS.-MADISON: CTR. FOR WORLD AFF. & GLOBAL
ECON., http://wage.wisc.edu/research/collaboratives/governance (last visited Aug. 21,
2011); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance
in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004). Characterizing the
inclusive and dynamic nature of New Governance approaches, Lobel explains:
Rather than oppositional, [this approach] aims for an appreciative positive
stance, pulling together disparate ingredients and synthesizing elements from
opposing schools of thought. Through new governance approaches,
contemporary thinkers can bring together in their research unlikely pairs, such
as privatization and democratic theory. The theory itself is thus reflexive, in the
sense that it calls for integration in legal practice and correspondingly
exemplifies hybridization in the academic field. Indeed, the theoretical basis for
[this] vision mirrors its practical application in its inclusive spirit.
Id. at 449; see also Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of
Learning, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 323, 328 (Gráinne de
Búrca & Joanne Scott eds., 2006); Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and
Principles-Based Securities Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 5 (2008); Helen Hershkoff &
Benedict Kingsbury, Crisis, Community, and Courts in Network Governance: A Response
to Liebman and Sabel’s Approach to Reform of Public Education, 28 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 319, 321-24 (2003); David Hess, Social Reporting and New Governance
Regulation: The Prospects of Achieving Corporate Accountability Through Transparency,
17 BUS. ETHICS Q. 453, 455 (2007); Michael B. Runnels, Dispute Resolution & New
Governance: Role of the Corporate Apology, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 481, 486-87 (2011);
William H. Simon, Solving Problems vs. Claiming Rights: The Pragmatist Challenge to
Legal Liberalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 127, 173-75 (2004). See generally THE TOOLS OF
GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002);
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 345-56 (1998); Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal
Thought and in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 471 (2004); James S. Liebman & Charles F. Sabel, A Public Laboratory Dewey
Barely Imagined: The Emerging Model of School Governance and Legal Reform, 28
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 183 (2003); Orly Lobel, Setting the Agenda for New
Governance Research, 89 MINN. L. REV. 498 (2004).
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engaged civil society—that encourage corporations to engage in
socially responsible behavior.14 Applying and analyzing Epstein’s
New Governance model yields three recommendations that
advance cooperative NRDA and improve corporate behavior
beyond the GE and BP cases. In Part IV, this article therefore
recommends the following: (1) reforming CERCLA and OPA, (2)
reframing Epstein’s model to include science as a mode of social
control, and (3) increasing corporate disclosure requirements. In
addition to incentivizing more cooperative NRDA, these reforms
will contribute to the transparency and accountability15 the
public has come to expect in the post-Enron era.
I.

COOPERATIVE NATURAL RESOURCE RESTORATION, IN
CONTEXT

This section integrates New Governance theory with
cooperative NRDA. Part A considers business reform, in
general, and ways to encourage positive corporate behavior.
Highlighting Epstein’s theory of New Governance, this section
explains movements that advocate CSR and New Governance
principles. Part B explains trends in environmental
policymaking that mirror business reform, especially those that
embody collaborative rather than adversarial approaches to
environmental protection. This section then considers NRDA
and ultimately integrates the policy of cooperative NRDA with
New Governance principles, highlighting trends toward
collaboration among stakeholders.
A.

Business Reform and New Governance

New Governance has emerged in response to CSR’s
inadequacies in incentivizing ethical corporate behavior.
Scholars often focus on the CSR movement and how its maxims
may be incorporated into the business-decision-making
process.16 CSR advocates encourage corporations to broaden
14

Edwin M. Epstein, The Good Company: Rhetoric or Reality? Corporate
Social Responsibility and Business Ethics Redux, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 207, 212-16 (2007)
(arguing that CSR is inherently insufficient in achieving the Good Company). Epstein
provides his own framework and describes corporations, by virtue of their economic and
political power, as the most efficient proxies through which his framework can
encourage the actualization of the Good Company. Id. at 210-12.
15
See generally Amiram Gill, Corporate Governance as Social Responsibility:
A Research Agenda, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 452, 465 (2008).
16
Id. at 463-66; see also George Cheney, Juliet Roper & Steve May, Overview,
in THE DEBATE OVER CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 3, 4 (Steve May, George
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relationships with multiple stakeholders, engage in meaningful
and sustained efforts to improve communities,17 and conform to
society’s laws and ethical customs.18 Increasingly, however,
scholars recognize that the CSR movement’s goals are
fundamentally flawed. Though some argue that corporations
ought to do good for goodness’s sake,19 several view such duties,
if not tethered to the corporate bottom line, as hopelessly
naïve.20 Moreover, critics argue that corporate marketing

Cheney & Juliet Roper eds., 2007) (explaining that conversations about unchecked
corporate power are central to conversations about how to “probe in an informed and
systematic way the potentials for positive social change in, through, and around the
modern corporation”); John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and
Embellish: Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31
J. CORP. L. 1, 37-38 (2005) (describing CSR as “a complex communication network
among public and private actors,” which, “[a]t its best, promises a corporate decision
making process in which managers think and talk openly about social and
environmental issues and then tell the world what they did and why”).
17
Cheney, Roper & May, supra note 16, at 3.
18
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES, (Magazine), Sept. 13, 1970, at 33, reprinted in BUSINESS ETHICS 17
(Tamara L. Roleff ed., 1996) (describing the responsibility of the corporate executive).
Friedman argues that this responsibility “is to conduct business in accordance with
[the shareholder’s] desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible
while conforming to the basic rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those
embodied in ethical custom.” Id. While Friedman articulates this point as a response to
the CSR movement, he fails to consider how ethical custom and the law interact.
Indeed, he fails to consider that ethical custom and the law are, in fact,
interdependent. See Cyrus Mehri, Andrea Giampetro-Meyer & Michael B. Runnels,
One Nation, Indivisible: The Use of Diversity Report Cards to Promote Transparency,
Accountability and Workplace Fairness, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 395, 407 (2004).
19
See, e.g., M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and
the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 581 (2009) (characterizing the
philosophical underpinnings of the CSR movement as based on the view that
corporations have a moral duty to do good for others, even at the expense of the bottom
line); see also David P. Baron, The Positive Theory of Moral Management, Social
Pressure, and Corporate Social Performance 5 (Rock Ctr. for Corporate Governance,
Working Paper No. 36, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913808 (arguing
that one of the principles underlying the CSR movement is that corporations have an
abstract “moral duty” to do good).
20
See Elizabeth F. Brown, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: Is There a Need
for a Safe Harbor for Aspirational Corporate Codes of Conduct?, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 367, 399 (2008) (explaining the reason why certain corporations do not engage in
CSR). Brown argues corporate reluctance is partly due to the fact that following CSR
principles is more expensive than not, and corporations cannot always pass the costs to
the consumer. Id. Moreover, Brown argues that “[p]art of those added costs are the
costs associated with increased risk of litigation that corporations adopting codes that
embody CSR principles face.” Id.; see also Janet E. Kerr, The Creative Capitalism
Spectrum: Evaluating Corporate Social Responsibility Through a Legal Lens, 81 TEMP.
L. REV. 831, 839 (2008) (characterizing CSR as profit-centric). Kerr explains that since
the effects of CSR on the bottom line have become quantifiable, the law supports, if not
requires, corporate managers to “investigate and consider whether CSR can impact the
bottom line.” Id. Kerr further argues that a corporate manager who does not consider
such linkages—who does not weigh profits as a consideration—could be considered
derelict in her duty. Id.
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strategists have effectively co-opted the CSR movement as a
tool to preserve branding and public image.21
Principles of New Governance can incentivize the
responsible behavior society expects. There is no single model
of New Governance; rather, several evolving models have been
developed and tried in various industries around the globe.22
The underlying premise of New Governance is that corporategovernance mechanisms, if they are to be responsive to public
expectations of responsible corporate behavior, must have
greater flexibilities. Furthermore, those flexibilities ought to be
animated by outcomes—not processes.23
New Governance promotes systems that “use
innovative, pragmatic, information-based, iterative, and
dialogic mechanisms to gather, distill, and leverage industry
learning in the service of a still-robust but better designed—
that is, more effective and less burdensome—public regulatory
mandate.”24 In every respect, deliberation among stakeholder
21

See, e.g., S. PRAKASH SETHI, SETTING GLOBAL STANDARDS: GUIDELINES FOR
CREATING CODES OF CONDUCT IN MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 45-63 (2003)
(regarding the marketing benefits from CSR and the widespread practice of insufficient
or inconsistent implementation); Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in
Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32
ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836, 838 (2007) (arguing that “some companies introduce CSR practices
at a superficial level for window-dressing purposes”); Joe W. (Chip) Pitts, III, Corporate
Social Responsibility: Current Status and Future Evolution, 6 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
334, 373-82 (2009) (finding credible the critiques that consider “CSR as, at best, toothless
and marketing-oriented, and at worst a malevolent strategy to co-opt or render powerless
the critical forces hoping to tame corporations with the more meaningful constraints of
law”); Betsy Atkins, Is Corporate Social Responsibility Responsible?, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2006,
12:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/corporatecitizenship/2006/11/16/leadership-philanthropycharity-lead-citizen-cx_ba_1128directorship.html (detailing the disingenuousness of
corporate CSR campaigns). Atkins writes that “[t]here are practical reasons why
corporations should cloak themselves in the politically correct rhetoric of social
responsibility. But marketing should not be confused with significant deployments of
corporate assets.” Id.; see also Gill, supra note 15, at 462 (arguing that “CSR has
become a business-sensitive, if not business-driven practice”). Gill notes that many
critics consider the CSR’s original motive to have been effectively subordinated to
corporate marketing strategies. Id.
22
See New Governance, supra note 13.
23
See supra note 13 and accompanying text. See generally Epstein, supra note 14.
24
See Ford, supra note 13, at 5 (describing the B.C. (British Columbia,
Canada) model as an example of the New Governance). Ford defines the linchpin of
this model as a “substantially [altered] relationship between regulators and
industry”—a relationship not defined by inflexible regulators mandating rules that are
often incompatible with fast-paced business environments, but a relationship defined
by a shared responsibility and a pragmatic responsiveness to “complex real-life social
systems.” Id. at 27. Ford goes on to describe this New Governance as the “most
effective mechanism for making decisions in complex organizational structures.” Id. at
27-28. This, Ford argues, is an “opportunity for dialogic and transparent securities
regulation,” viewed from the perspective of industry, regulators, shareholders,
stakeholders, and CSR advocates. Id. at 27-28, 60.
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groups is central to New Governance approaches.25 Rather than
emphasize checklist-style compliance with prescriptive legal
rules—which often incentivizes corporate actors to discover and
abuse loopholes26—New Governance principles encourage
groups to orient themselves in the underlying policy priorities
of those rules. In turn, New Governance approaches
continually revise both means and ends to solve problems as
they arise.27 New Governance approaches also strive to foster
transparency and accountability; envision corporate decision
making as a collaborative, rather than an adversarial, process;
and “provide[] a rational, systemic alternative to draconian
rule-making and [its] often adverse effects on business.”28
Statute and policy reform (in the environmental arena
and elsewhere) have emerged as a result of New Governance
principles. For example, British Columbia’s Bill 38 offers a
principle-based and outcome-oriented approach to securities
regulation.29 One part of Bill 38 replaces detailed, compliancebased rules governing dealers and advisors with rules arranged
under broader standards.30 These broader standards motivate
dealers and advisors to exercise sound judgment, whereas the
compliance approach motivated mere adherence to rules that
might have been misconstrued.31
Political scientists Christopher McGrory Klyza and
David Sousa, in their review of American environmental policy,
recounted two further examples of collaborative approaches in
environmental protection.32 Quincy Library Group in Northern
California brought a variety of participants together—local
politicians, environmentalists, and members of the timber
industry—to create a logging plan that better supports the

25

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See Ford, supra note 13, at 29 (arguing that while corporations strictly
adhering to the letter of the law may appear ideal, such strict adherence, paradoxically,
may generate the very moral hazards that undermine corporate governance objectives—
through incentivizing the corporate discovery and abuse of regulatory loopholes).
27
Id. at 29-30.
28
Michael B. Runnels, Elizabeth J. Kennedy & Timothy B. Brown, Corporate
Social Responsibility and the New Governance: In Search of Epstein’s Good Company in
the Employment Context, 43 AKRON L. REV. 501, 534 (2010).
29
Ford, supra note 13. British Columbia passed Bill 38, and is currently
implementing principles-based securities regulation. History of the 2004 BC Securities
Legislation, BRIT. COLUM. SEC. COMMISSION, http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/instruments.aspx?id=
1894 (last visited Aug. 21, 2011).
30
Ford, supra note 13, at 17-18.
31
Id. at 19.
32
CHRISTOPHER
MCGRORY
KLYZA &
DAVID SOUSA,
AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, 1990-2006: BEYOND GRIDLOCK 244 (2008).
26
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environment.33 Another group of ranchers and environmentalists,
the Quivara Coalition, collaborated on an environmentally
conscious cattle-ranching plan.34 These examples illustrate
mechanisms that deemphasize draconian-rule making, which
often typifies inflexible regulation. Instead, these examples
emphasize cooperation among business, government, and
additional stakeholder groups as a means to improve decision
making. These examples are typical of the New Governance
movement.35
In one application of New Governance theory, Epstein
considered factors that induce corporations to become “Good
Companies”—companies that act as ethical corporate citizens.36
In particular, Epstein found, six “modes of social control”37
encourage corporations to engage in socially responsible
behavior—law, affinity group regulation, self-regulation, ethical
precepts, the media, and an engaged civil society.38 Epstein’s
model provides a practical framework with which scholars can
systematically develop—and redevelop—methods to galvanize
positive corporate behavior.
In brief, Epstein defined the modes of social control as
follows: Law is the articulation of public policy enforced by
government.39 Affinity group regulation refers to standards of
behavior established by members of a particular profession,

33

Id. at 233-36.
Id. at 236-40.
35
While New Governance taxonomies are often contested, a core element in
virtually all the theory’s formulations is that private-public associations and networks
animated by a series of new regulatory frameworks may achieve social and public good.
See generally Colin Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the PostRegulatory State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY
REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145 (Jacint Jordana & David Levi-Faur eds.,
2004) (exploring theoretical approaches to regulation and providing a foundation for
New Governance scholarship); see also Ford, supra note 13, at 28 (conceptualizing a
New Governance framework for securities regulation, Ford explains that it would
entail a regulatory structure that “spans the so-called public/private divide, pulls
industry experience into regulatory decision making, and establishes robust ongoing
communication mechanisms (rather than an information-hoarding, adversarial
relationship) between industry and regulator”).
36
See Epstein, supra note 14, at 210-13 (arguing that the modern corporate
social responsibility movement is inherently insufficient in encouraging ethical
corporate behavior, Epstein provides his own framework as the means by which one
can incentivize the actualization of the Good Company).
37
Id. at 210-12.
38
Id. at 212-16 (arguing that CSR is inherently insufficient in achieving the
Good Company). Epstein provides his own framework and describes corporations, by
virtue of their economic and political power, as the most efficient proxies through
which his framework can encourage the actualization of the Good Company. Id.
39
Id. at 210.
34
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such as medicine.40 Self-regulation is the voluntary adherence
to issue-specific standards (such as standards concerning
climate change) set by nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs).41 Companies that self-regulate are expected to comply
with standards voluntarily and in good faith.42 Ethical precepts
are beliefs “derive[d] from religion, humanistic philosophy,
social customs, mores, and traditions.”43 Ethics often inform or
inspire laws.44 Vigilant and responsible media respond to
corporate malfeasance by reporting material that renders
corporate behavior transparent.45 Finally, an engaged civil
society refers to direct-citizen action through the leveling of
pressure on government officials.46
While law has traditionally served as the centerpiece to
control corporate behavior, legal and CSR scholars increasingly
recognize that corporate malfeasance is highly context-specific.
For example, in a given situation some modes may work better
than others to encourage socially beneficial corporate
behavior.47 Epstein’s model will be applied below in Part III.
B.

Environmental Policymaking, NRDA, and Cooperative
NRDA

The rise of New Governance in business brought with it
an attempt to create new cooperative approaches to
environmental regulation. Legal scholars have noted that the
shift from command-and-control approaches was concomitant
with business reform’s shift to New Governance.48 Regulators
40

Id. at 210-11.
Id. at 211.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 211-12.
45
Id. at 212.
46
Id.
47
See generally Runnels, Kennedy & Brown, supra note 28. Epstein lists his
modes of social control in descending order of importance: law, affinity group
regulation, self-regulation, ethical precepts, the media, and an engaged civil society.
Epstein, supra note 14, at 210. In addition to arguing that the modes be used in a
prescribed order of importance, he also contends that each mode must be used to
galvanize ethical corporate behavior. Id. at 212. Runnels, Kennedy, and Brown
discount Epstein’s argument that his modes must be both considered in a precise order
and in concert. They suggest instead that context matters in terms of which, and how,
the modes are applied. Runnels, Kennedy & Brown, supra note 28, at 513.
48
Lisa Blomgren Bingham, The Next Generation of Administrative Law:
Building the Legal Infrastructure for Collaborative Governance, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 297,
300. Blomgren Bingham describes developments in statutory administrative law. She
indicates that “[c]ollaborative governance represents an emerging alternative to
traditional command-and-control approaches to making, implementing, and enforcing
41

2011]

COOPERATIVE NRDA & NEW GOVERNANCE

117

that utilize command-and-control approaches command
particular environmental goals and issue instructions, or
controls, detailing how to reach those goals.49 Collaborative
approaches, however, bring stakeholders together to share
information and seek solutions that support a both-and agenda.50
Similar to a “win-win” situation, a both-and agenda seeks to both
achieve environmental goals and factor in economic concerns.51
Today, a range of environmental policy areas endorse problem
solving that is consistent with the both-and policy—collaborative,
voluntary, and transparent (e.g., collaborative watershed
management52 and collaborative energy management).53
CERCLA and OPA, however, rest on the outdated
approaches of yesteryear. Congress passed CERCLA in 1980 at
the end of the Environmental Era—the golden era of
environmental lawmaking, from 1964 to 1980.54 Congress passed
OPA in 199055 as the shift from command-and-control to
collaborative approaches was beginning.56 Not surprisingly, the

policy.” Id. She also notes that collaborative governance relates to new governance,
“which includes the use of policy tools that involve privatization of previously public
work and devolution of responsibility from unitary bureaucracies to networks and
contracts.” Id.
49
Command and control rules impose detailed limits on industrial operations
with the goal of controlling companies that pollute. Rena I. Steinzor, Reinventing
Environmental Regulation: The Dangerous Journey from Command to Self-Control, 22
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 103, 104 (1998). Command-and-control approaches mandate
behavior, are generally inflexible, and specify “compliancy strategies for achieving a
rigidly defined environmental benchmark.” Laurie A. Wayburn & Anton A. Chiono, The
Role of Federal Policy in Establishing Ecosystem Service Markets, 20 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 385, 403-04 (2010).
50
Highlights of the Collaboration Era are: “(1) the replacement of traditional
consultative agency practices with much more collaborative and consensus-based
approaches, (2) the large range of governmental and nongovernmental actors involved,
and (3) the recognition that decision making should not be left to bureaucratic experts.”
PAUL A. SABATIER ET AL., SWIMMING UPSTREAM: COLLABORATIVE APPROACHES TO
WATERSHED MANAGEMENT 50-51 (2005). Decision-making processes should reflect
scientific and local knowledge. Additionally, processes should be responsive to a range
of stakeholders. See id.
51
KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 32, at 5. Creative problem-solving can take
away the notion of either-or—that a group can respond to either environmental
concerns or economic concerns, not both.
52
SABATIER ET AL., supra note 50.
53
For example, the U.S. Energy Star program, a government-backed
program that helps businesses and individuals protect the environment through
superior energy efficiency, relies on collaboration with stakeholder groups, especially
industry. About ENERGY STAR, ENERGY STAR, http://www.energystar.gov/
index.cfm?c=about.ab_index (last visited Aug. 21, 2011).
54
KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 32, at 1.
55
Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2006).
56
KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 32, at 3.
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NRDA processes outlined in both statutes and their accompanying
regulations exemplify the command-and-control approach.57
Recall that CERCLA outlines legal requirements for
cleanup and restoration after releases of hazardous substances at
waste sites,58 while OPA outlines legal requirements for cleanup
and restoration after oil spills.59 Both CERCLA and OPA define
natural resources broadly—fish, wildlife, drinking water supplies,
land, and other such resources that the United States somehow
controls (e.g., property it manages or holds in trust).60 Though
CERCLA and OPA tailor responses to different environmental
needs, the NRDA processes under both statutes are similar.
In NRDA, state and federal natural-resource agencies,
such as the Department of the Interior (DOI) and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), serve as
Trustees. During restoration, the RP replaces the resources or
acquires equivalent resources. Additionally, RPs may
compensate the public for the interim loss of natural resources
contaminated by the incident. Trustees achieve naturalresource restoration by negotiating with RPs or forcing RPs to
act through litigation.61 Scientists, engineers, economists, and

57

Although OPA includes the word cooperative, RPs and Trustees still
assume an adversarial relationship in practice under OPA’s NRDA process. See infra
notes 218-22 and accompanying text.
58
CERCLA was enacted in response to the Love Canal disaster. Basic
Information: What Is Superfund?, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
superfund/about.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). For an article exploring aspects of the
complicated CERCLA process, which are beyond the scope of this article, see Jason J.
Czarnezki & Adrianne K. Zahner, The Utility of Non-Use Values in Natural Resource
Damage Assessments, 32 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 509 (2005). Czarnezki and Zahner urge
CERCLA trustees to advance public interest by engaging in proper valuation of natural
resource damages. In particular, they urge trustees to include “non-use” values in NRDA.
Id. at 512. Non-use value includes “the simple knowledge that something exists . . . , the
potential for its use . . . , or the expectation that it will be of use to future generations.” Id.
at 511. These attributes are existence, option, and bequest value. Id.
59
OPA was enacted in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill. Oil Pollution
Act Overview, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/osweroe1/content/
lawsregs/opaover.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). For an interesting article that
explores the complex, uncertain NRDA process that followed the Valdez spill, see
Sanne Knudsen, A Precautionary Tale: Assessing Ecological Damages After the Exxon
Valdez Oil Spill, 7 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 95 (2009).
60
Both CERCLA and OPA define “natural resources” broadly to include “land,
fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies, and other such
resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 2701(20) (2006). See generally Natural
Resource Damages: A Primer, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/
superfund/programs/nrd/primer.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) [hereinafter NRD Primer].
61
Conner & Gouguet, supra note 11, at 20.
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regulatory specialists join Trustees and RPs as they follow the
DOI and NOAA methodologies of NRDA.62
The CERCLA NRDA Process includes four phases: (1)
preassessment screening, (2) assessment planning, (3)
assessment implementation, and (4) postassessment.63 During
preassessment, Trustees determine whether natural resources
have been injured.64 In the second stage, the assessment plan,
Trustees confirm that pollutants have affected trust resources.
They then develop an assessment plan that outlines the
procedures Trustees will use to assess damages.65 During
assessment implementation, Trustees gather data to quantify
injuries and determine damages.66 Scientists conduct field and
laboratory studies to evaluate injuries to natural resources.67
Trustees then compare information from injury investigations
to baseline conditions in order to develop resource or service
loss estimates.68 The final phase, postassessment, identifies
restoration options and establishes monitoring protocols to
ensure the success of the selected restoration projects.69
The OPA NRDA Process includes three phases: (1)
preliminary assessment, (2) injury assessment, and (3)
restoration implementation.70 During preliminary assessment,
Trustees determine the impacts of pollutants on natural
resources.71 Scientists collect time-sensitive data and review
scientific literature to determine how a particular hazardous
substance has affected trust resources.72 If Trustees determine
that resources are injured, they proceed to the second phase.73
62

NRD Primer, supra note 59 (outlining the details of NRD assessments
under both CERCLA and OPA). The Primer outlines the DOI’s methodologies with
regard to NRD under CERCLA. It also outlines the NRDA methodologies under OPA.
63
Natural Resource Damage Assessment, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/nrd/nrda2.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
15 C.F.R. §§ 990.40-60 (2010); see also Damage Assessment: How Natural
Resource Damage Assessment Works, NOAA: GULF SPILL RESTORATION: DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION PROGRAM, http://www.gulfspillrestoration.
noaa.gov/assessment/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
71
15 C.F.R. § 990.42.
72
Mathematical models designed to help predict the fate and effects of the spill
on trust resources may also be used. Pre-Assessment: Phase One: Studying the Impacts,
NOAA: GULF SPILL RESTORATION: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION
PROGRAM, http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/assessment/pre-assessment/ (last visited
Feb. 19, 2011).
73
Id.
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In this phase, injury assessment, Trustees quantify the scope of
the injuries and “identify possible restoration projects.”74
Trustees rely on both economic and scientific studies to assess
the injuries to natural resources and the impact on the public
use of those resources.75 Additionally, Trustees use these
studies to develop a restoration plan that details ways to work
toward quick recovery of the injured resources and payment to
parties who suffered losses due to natural resource injuries.76
Trustees then evaluate the restoration options and ask the
public to comment on a draft of the restoration plan.77
The Trustees move on to the final phase of OPA’s NRDA
process once the injury assessment is complete.78 In this phase,
restoration, the restoration plan is implemented while NOAA
and other Trustees monitor its effectiveness.79 The Trustees
first identify the full spectrum of injuries and determine the
optimal restoration procedures.80 The Trustees, working in
tandem with the public, then select and implement the
restoration projects.81 The costs of assessment and restoration
are borne by the RPs, who work cooperatively with the
Trustees.82 If the RPs refuse to bear these costs, the Trustees
may file a lawsuit or submit a claim of damages to the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund.83 The United States may then seek to
recover the costs paid out by the fund from the RPs.84 The
restoration that Trustees implement may fall into any or all of
the following categories: emergency restoration,85 primary
restoration,86 compensatory restoration,87 or early restoration.88
74

Injury Assessment: Phase Two: Focusing on Injuries, NOAA: GULF SPILL
RESTORATION: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION PROGRAM,
http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/assessment/injury-assessment/ (last visited
Feb. 23, 2011).
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Restoration: Final Phase: Restoring Resources, NOAA: GULF SPILL
RESTORATION: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION PROGRAM,
http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/assessment/restoration/ (last visited Feb. 23,
2011) [hereinafter Restoration: Final Phase].
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
For additional information, see The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund, NAT’L
POLLUTION FUNDS CENTER: FUNDING TODAY FOR A CLEANER TOMORROW,
http://www.uscg.mil/npfc/About_NPFC/osltf.asp (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
84
See infra note 88.
85
Restoration: Final Phase, supra note 79. NOAA defines “emergency
restoration” to include “actions that are taken by the trustees prior to the completion of
the damage assessment and restoration planning process to prevent or reduce
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NRDA can be both time-consuming and expensive.89 And
despite the seemingly collaborative nature of the process, in the
end, RPs and Trustees are poised to litigate, not negotiate.
Cooperative NRDA processes, however—where Trustees and
RPs voluntarily work together to resolve natural resource
liability90—reduce costs and increase restoration’s efficiency. In
cooperative NRDA, Trustees and RPs engage in strategic
collaboration to generate accurate information and share that
information with an eye toward restoration.91
Michael Ammann, a Staff Environmental Scientist at
ChevronTexaco Energy Technology Company, explained that
cooperative NRDA is more likely when Trustees and RPs
develop a commonly held vision of what a successful
restoration project would look like.92 Ammann described an
example of a specific pollution incident, an oil spill that
occurred in Bay Point, California, when a Chevron pipeline
ruptured.93 Ammann indicated that, when NRDA for the oil
spill began, a representative of California’s Department of Fish
and Game’s Office of Spill Prevention and Response suggested
a specific restoration project the parties could use.94 This
representative’s suggestion laid the foundation for what
continuing natural resource impacts and prevent potential irreversible loss of natural
resources.” Id.
86
Id. NOAA defines “primary restoration” as those actions that “return[] the
impacted resources to the condition that would have existed if the incident had not
occurred.” Id.
87
Id. NOAA defines “compensatory restoration” as those actions that address
the “losses from the date of injury until recovery is completed.” Id.
88
Id. NOAA describes “early restoration” as “a form of compensatory
restoration, [which] can be implemented prior to the completion of the NRDA process,
when opportunities arise, to achieve restoration faster.” Id.
89
Conner & Gouguet, supra note 11, at 20. The parties share a “commitment
to identifying a fair and appropriate amount of restoration for the oil spill or waste site
under consideration.” Id. at 24. NRD includes the reasonable costs of a damage
assessment. In practice, this means RPs or PRPs (Potentially Responsible Parties)
engaged in a NRDA are liable for the Trustees’ assessment costs as well as the natural
resource restoration costs. Id. at 20. The damage assessment can take five years or
more. If the case ends in litigation, the process could take five to ten additional years.
Moreover, parties (Trustees and RPs) are sometimes reluctant to share data.
“[L]itigation quality” NRDA is especially expensive, and RPs end up paying for it. Id.
90
Id. at 24.
91
Id. at 24-25. Conner and Gouguet indicate that the following would be
indicative of cooperative NRDA: parties would share information, guide the NRDA
process with the best scientific research, involve the principals, conduct an open
process, and deal effectively with disagreement. Id. at 26.
92
Michael Ammann, Shared Vision. Sounds Obvious. Can We Make It
Happen?, ENVTL. F., May-June 2004, at 21.
93
Id.
94
Id. The Trustee was a representative of the California Department of Fish
and Game’s Office of Spill Prevention and Response. Id.
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successful restoration would look like; the RP and Trustees
would work towards a common goal.95 Moving forward with the
shared vision, the RP (Chevron) and Trustees voluntarily
reached agreements regarding injuries and how to respond to
future risks.96 The parties settled the NRDA in three meetings97:
“By focusing on restoration, managing uncertainty, and
avoiding unnecessary studies, restoration was achieved faster
and all parties realized savings in transactions costs, especially
consultant and legal fees.”98
From the opposing perspective of a community
organization, Mark Davis, Executive Director of the Coalition
to Restore Coastal Louisiana in Baton Rouge, recounted a story
of public and private actors who worked together to protect and
restore Bayou Trepagnier.99 The process involved a coalition of
stakeholders, including Shell Oil Company (the RP), state
Trustees
(including
the
Louisiana
Department
of
Environmental Quality, or DEQ) and federal Trustees (the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, or NOAA).
The parties worked with the Coalition to Restore Coastal
Louisiana (which represented local interests) to resolve
complex, contentious issues.100 In evaluating the NRDA process,
Davis wrote, “[W]hat NRDA did was provide a forum and
enough compulsion to begin to work issues through.”101 The
parties reached a settlement, and Davis highlighted the
importance of community groups in bringing about the
cooperative process.102

95

Id.
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. Cooperative NRDA can be highly technical. It includes these two
features: (1) restoration-based assessments, and (2) integration of NRDA processes and
cleanup. Conner & Gouguet, supra note 11, at 22. Restoration-based assessments allow
Trustees and RPs to focus on “restoration of the injured resources rather than on
valuation of the lost resources and services.” Id. The focus is on “getting to restoration,”
and seeking “the cost of carrying out the restoration as the measure of damages rather
than the value of the injured resources and lost services.” Id. Similarly, “prospective
restoration” refers to processes that consider restoration at the beginning of an NRDA
claim. Prospective restoration allows for some natural resources to be restored,
providing ecological services and saving costs, while the formal NRDA process unfolds
over the course of several years. Stephen K. Davis, Lawrence D. Malizzi & Nel Yoskin,
How Prospective Restoration and Planning Can Be Use in the Settlement of Dredging
Natural Resource Damage Cases (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
99
Mark Davis, Community Organizations Can Make the Process Work,
ENVTL. F., May-June 2004, at 25.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
96
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As these examples illustrate, cooperative NRDA
provides the collaborative, consensus-based approach that
promises to work more effectively than command-and-control
approaches. Unfortunately, the cooperative NRDA examples
this section has described remain the ideal. The next two cases
illustrate adversarial NRDA—the reality.
II.

GE, BP, AND NRDA PROCESSES UNDER CERCLA AND
OPA

A.

GE, PCBs, and the Hudson River

In 1942, GE began using polychlorinated biphenyls, or
PCBs, in its capacitators.103 As part of the manufacturing
process for electrical transformers and capacitors,104 GE
discharged PCBs into the Hudson River,105 among other
locations.106 In 1977, the EPA banned the direct discharge of
PCBs into U.S. waters.107 At that time, the synthetic compounds
were described as a “highly toxic . . . chemical”108 that resists
biological degradation and is, consequently, “one of the most
serious of the . . . environmental contamination problems
prevalent today.”109 The Environmental Defense Fund, a
Washington-based environmental law firm, led the actions that
challenged PCB discharges and asked the EPA to rule on the
proposed ban.110

103

See FRANCES F. DUNWELL, THE HUDSON: AMERICA’S RIVER 301 (2008); see also
AUSTL. & N.Z. ENV’T & CONSERVATION COUNCIL, IDENTIFICATION OF PCB-CONTAINING
CAPACITORS (1997), available at http://www.environment.gov.au/settlements/publications/
chemicals/scheduled-waste/pubs/pcbid.pdf.
104
Bayard Webster, E.P.A. Bans Discharge of PCB’s Directly into the Nation’s
Waters, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1977, at 22. Monsanto Industrial Chemicals Company
was, as of 1977, the only American maker of PCBs. PCBs were also used in metal
casting plants and in the recycling of wastepaper. Id.
105
Id.
106
GE “is a responsible party in 52 active Superfund sites across the country.”
Andrew C. Revkin, Dredging of Pollutants Begins in Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2009,
at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/16/science/earth/16dredge.html?
pagewanted=all.
107
Webster, supra note 104.
108
Id. PCBs were identified as “a close relative of DDT,” which had already
been “found in scientific studies to cause deformities in fetuses, changes in liver
function, nervous disorders, and cancer in animals.” Id.
109
Id. In 1970, during hearings about Con Edison’s proposed hydroelectric
project in Cornwall, New York—Storm King Mountain—a leading federal marine
biologist, John R. Clark, first raised concerns about PCBs in the Hudson. See
DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 301.
110
See DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 301. The same firm had also led the
actions that yielded the DDT ban in 1972. Webster, supra note 104, at 22.

124

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:1

By the time the EPA banned the discharge of PCBs into
U.S. waters, GE had already released approximately 1.3 million
pounds of PCBs into the Hudson.111 In 1976, commercial fishing
in the Hudson River was banned due to the PCB releases.112
Scientists determined that Hudson River fish ingested much
more than the permissible level of the chemical to be safe for
human consumption.113 In particular, scientists believed that
consuming fish from the upper Hudson could increase the risk of
cancer.114 GE negotiated a settlement with the State Department
of Environmental Conservation wherein GE agreed to cease
PCB dumping, pay $3 million toward cleansing the river, and
provide $1 million for PCB research.115 This settlement was
significant because, after it, New York citizens no longer had
recourse against GE under state law.
In 1980, Congress passed CERCLA, which required GE
to clean or neutralize PCBs in the river.116 In the early 1980s,
talk of dredging the river bottom began.117 GE relied on scientists
and lawyers to create and implement strategies to avoid
dredging.118 GE accused the EPA of “shoddy science” and argued
that tightening the spigot at or near the polluting plants was
sufficient for restoration.119 GE maintained that sediments from
the past were stagnant and no cause for concern.120 By this point,
an environmental group, Scenic Hudson, emerged as the
primary advocate for the public regarding the natural resources
in and around the Hudson River.121
The EPA issued a report detailing the status of the
Hudson in 1997. Although GE had managed to stop new PCB
leaks, heavy concentrations of PCBs remained at the bottom of
Thompson Island Pool, a six-mile stretch of river downstream
from GE’s plants in Ford Edward and Hudson Falls.122 But more

111

Revkin, supra note 106.
DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 312.
113
SHELDON KAMIENIECKI, CORPORATE AMERICA AND ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: HOW OFTEN DOES BUSINESS GET ITS WAY? 144 (2006).
114
Id.; see also Editorial, The PCB War Heats Up, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1997,
§ 4, at 14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/02/opinion/the-pcb-war-heatsup.html (last visited Aug. 21, 2011) [hereinafter PCB War].
115
DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 312.
116
Id.
117
KAMIENIECKI, supra note 113, at 144.
118
Id. at 145.
119
PCB War, supra note 114.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
112
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importantly, PCBs had not biodegraded or detoxified.123
Undegraded, PCBs that were buried for decades entered the food
chain where they could biomagnify to toxic concentrations.124
In 2000, after studying PCBs and health hazards, the
EPA ordered GE to spend a half-billion dollars over five years
to dredge toxic PCBs embedded in the river bottom north of
Albany.125 In particular, the EPA determined that PCB levels in
the upper Hudson’s fish were still unacceptably high.126 Carol
Browner, the EPA administrator at the time, asserted, “This
river needs to be cleaned up. It will not clean itself.”127 New
York Governor George Pataki endorsed the strategy of forcing
GE to dredge and pay for the dredging.128
In protest, GE argued that “someone would have to eat
a half-pound of fish a week for forty years to run even a remote
cancer risk.”129 Moreover, GE issued a reminder of the state’s
catch-and-release policy, which required fisherman to return
caught fish to the water.130 The EPA and environmental groups
responded simply that the river should be cleaned.131 GE then
launched a public relations campaign to argue that dredging
the river would “devastate the lives of upriver communities.”132
From the mid-1990s to the early 2000s, GE conducted a
multimillion-dollar campaign aimed at both politicians and
citizens, highlighting the dangers of removing PCBs from the
river.133 GE also asserted that the dredging would “disrupt river
life for a generation.”134
The EPA issued a record of decision in 2002 that laid
out a legally binding cleanup plan.135 The decision—devised
123

Id.
Editorial, Plausible Plan for the Hudson, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2000, at A38,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/08/opinion/plausible-plan-for-the-hudson.html
[hereinafter Plausible Plan].
125
DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 312.
126
Charlie Cray, Toxins on the Hudson: The Saga of GE, PCBs and the
Hudson River, 22 MULTINATIONAL MONITOR, July/Aug. 2001, available at
http://www.multinationalmonitor.org/mm2001/01july-august/julyaug01corp1.html.
127
Id.
128
Plausible Plan, supra note 124.
129
Id.
130
Id.
131
See id.
132
Id.
133
KAMIENIECKI, supra note 113, at 145.
134
John M. Glionna, Dredging Up Ill Will on the Hudson, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 1,
2001, at 17, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2001/oct/01/news/mn-52036.
135
Editorial, Waiting for G.E., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2006, at 14WC, available at
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A01E0D71630F935A15750C0A9609C8B63
[hereinafter Waiting].
124
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under the Clinton administration and ratified by President
Bush’s EPA administrator, Christine Todd Whitman—was
considered “a mix of politics and science.”136 In April 2002, after
exhausting nearly all avenues to appeal the decision, GE
changed its position and offered to clean the Hudson River.137
In 2005, after years of denying responsibility, GE signed
a consent decree committing itself to the removal of PCBs from
the Hudson River.138 The plan called for dredging to begin in
2007,139 but environmental groups wondered whether GE would
continue “a timeworn pattern of grinding delay.”140 The decree
called for two phases of cleanup and bound GE to just the first
phase—a year-long, $100 million project to remove the thickest
PCB deposits, 2.65 million yards of tainted mud.141 Phase Two—
a five-year, $500 million project—calls for the dredging of the
remaining 90 percent of sediment.142 The second phase covers
sediment spread over a much larger, though less heavily
contaminated, area.143
In 2006, GE submitted a detailed cleanup plan to the EPA
and announced that the company could start dredging in 2008 at
the earliest.144 On May 16, 2009, GE began the Phase One
dredging.145 Mile-long freight trains carried the dredged sediment
to a hazardous-waste landfill in Texas.146 The plan requires the
company to replace the sediment with uncontaminated soil and
native plants.147 In the meantime, GE continued to fight, this time
challenging CERCLA’s constitutionality.148
136

Revkin, supra note 106.
DUNWELL, supra note 103, at 150. For an article arguing against dredging
of the Hudson, see generally Erik Claudio, Comment, How the EPA May Be Selling
General Electric Down the River: A Law and Economics Analysis of the $460 Million
Hudson River Cleanup Plan, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 409 (2002) (arguing that, under
a cost-benefit analysis, dredging is an improper solution to the Hudson River cleanup).
138
CMTY. ADVISORY GRP., HUDSON RIVER PCBS SUPERFUND SITE: SUMMARY OF
CONSENT DECREE WITH GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY (2005), available at
http://www.hudsoncag.ene.com/files/CAG%20presentation.v2..pdf.
139
Editorial, A Commitment on PCB’s, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, at 14WC,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/opinion/nyregionopinions/WE_EPA.html
?pagewanted=print.
140
Id.
141
Id.
142
Id.
143
Id.; see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
144
Waiting, supra note 135.
145
Revkin, supra note 106.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
In June 2010, GE lost this case in a federal appeals court. Brent Kendall,
Appeals Court Rejects GE Challenge to Superfund Law, WALL ST. J. (June 30, 2010),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704103904575336813411467390.html.
137
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Like the cleanup process, the NRDA process is also
underway. The Hudson River National Resource Trustees are
the DOI, NOAA, and New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation.149 The EPA coordinates with the
Trustees per CERCLA requirements.150
The Trustees released the Hudson River Preassessment
Screen in October 1997151 and subsequently undertook injury
assessment.152 They have planned or completed numerous
studies, including wildlife injury, water- and air-quality injury,
and pathway determination (e.g., floodplain evaluation).153 On
September 16, 2002, the Trustees issued the assessment plan for
the Hudson River. The plan identifies procedures that the
Trustees must use to evaluate injuries to natural resources
caused by PCBs.154 The Trustees are currently in the process of
implementing the Assessment Plan.155 As part of this process, the
Trustees continue to engage in studies on biological resources
(such as fish, birds, amphibians, reptiles, and mammals) and
other natural resources (such as surface water).156 During the
implementation phase, the Trustees engage in ongoing
monitoring of actions related to the Hudson cleanup. On May 7,

149

HUDSON RIVER NATURAL RES. TRS., RESPONSIVENESS SUMMARY FOR THE
HUDSON RIVER NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PLAN (2003), available at
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42 U.S.C. § 9601 (2006).
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Natural Resource Damage Assessment, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE:
N.Y. FIELD OFFICE, http://www.fws.gov/northeast/nyfo/ec/nrda.htm (last updated May
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U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES UNDER CERCLA (1993),
available at http://homer.ornl.gov/sesa/environment/guidance/cercla/nrda.pdf.
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HUDSON RIVER NATURAL RES. TRS., HUDSON RIVER NATURAL RESOURCE
DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: SUMMARY OF THE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT PLAN (2002), available at
http://www.fws.gov/contaminants/restorationplans/HudsonRiver/docs/HudsonRiverNRDA
FactSheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2011) [hereinafter HUDSON RIVER NATURAL
RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT].
These preliminary investigations include an avian egg exposure investigation,
floodplain soil and biota screening, an assessment of mink, muskrat and otter
for PCB exposure, a snapping turtle egg exposure investigation and an
assessment of contaminant levels in bullfrog and snapping turtle tissue,
preliminary investigations of Eastern screech owl eggs and peregrine falcon
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Natural Resource Damage Assessment: N.Y. Field Office, supra note 151.
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2010, for example, the Trustees offered support for the EPA’s
decision to enforce dredging of the Hudson River.157
B.

BP, the Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill, and the Gulf of
Mexico

While BP brands itself “Beyond Petroleum,” an
environmentally conscientious energy company, its reputation
is now stained158 by the April 2010 explosion of its Deepwater
Horizon drilling rig.159 The explosion, forty miles from the
ecologically fragile Louisiana coast,160 killed eleven people and
released millions of barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico.161
After the explosion, oil gushed from a cracked BP pipeline a
mile beneath the ocean’s surface.162 At first, BP claimed 1000
barrels of oil were released per day163 but later changed its
estimate to 5000.164 BP maintained that the 5000-barrel figure
was accurate165 even as outside scientists protested that BP
deliberately low-balled the actual figure.166 Despite BP’s
purported estimates, Congressperson Edward J. Markey, Chair
of the House Energy and Environment Subcommittee, sought
and secured the release of an internal BP document that
revealed BP’s damage analysis and actual estimation—a worst-

157

Press Release, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., Hudson River Trustees Support
EPA Stand on Dredging River (May 7, 2010), available at http://www.fws.gov/
news/newsreleases/showNews.cfm?newsId=74BE077C-EC03-0EB9-45BF36771CBE4CC0.
158
Krissah Thompson, BP’s Long Road to Regaining Consumer Confidence in Its
Brand, WASH. POST, Aug. 18, 2010, at A2, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/08/18/AR2010081803063.html; Clifford Krauss, Oil Spill’s Blow
to BP’s Image May Eclipse Costs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2010, at B1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/30/business/30bp.html.
159
Campbell Robertson, Search Continues After Oil Rig Blast, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 22, 2010, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22rig.html.
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Clifford Krauss, Overhead and on the Ground, Waiting for a Potential
Environmental Disaster to Hit, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2010, at A11, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/01/us/01spill.html (describing the coastal region of
Louisiana, which includes the Mississippi River Delta, as ecologically sensitive and
explaining the disaster that would result if the oil lands onshore).
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Frank James, Deepwater Horizon’s 11 Dead Remembered, TWO-WAY:
NPR’S NEWS BLOG, (May 25, 2010, 9:57 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwoway/2010/05/deepwater_horizon_11_dead_reme.html.
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Tom Eley, One Year Since the BP Oil Spill: Covering Up a Catastrophe,
WORLD SOCIALIST WEB SITE (Apr. 20, 2011), http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/
apr2011/bps1-a20.shtml.
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Justin Gillis, Size of Oil Spill Underestimated, Scientists Say, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/14/us/14oil.html.
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Eley, supra note 162.
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case scenario of 100,000 barrels per day.167 Ultimately, the
government declared the flow rate to be 62,000 barrels a day.168
To date, the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, beyond question, is
the worst oil spill in U.S. history.169
Soon after the rig explosion, BP executives faced harsh
questioning from Congress regarding the foreseeability of the
disaster.170 “The leaders of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce cited five areas in which the company had made
decisions that increased the danger of a catastrophic well”171:
the well’s design,172 improper maintenance of the blowout
preventer,173 inadequate preparation and testing of the well
casing’s cement job,174 misleading assurances that the well was
properly sealed,175 and the lackadaisical preparation of a
government-mandated oil-spill-response plan.176
President Obama appointed a commission to explore the
causes of the BP oil spill. The commission confirmed the
findings of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce—

167

Andrew C. Revkin, Early BP Worst Case on Flow: ‘100,000 Barrels Per Day,’
N.Y. TIMES DOT EARTH BLOG (June 20, 2010, 12:57 PM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/
2010/06/20/early-bp-worst-case-on-flow-100000-barrels-per-day/
(noting
the
striking
difference between BP’s public statements and internal assessments regarding the
estimated flow of oil).
168
Joel Achenbach & David A. Fahrenthold, Oil Spill Dumped 4.9 Million Barrels
into Gulf of Mexico, Latest Measure Shows, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/02/AR2010080204695.html
(addressing the governments revision of earlier spill estimates).
169
Bob Herbert, An Unnatural Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2010, at A25,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/29/opinion/29herbert.html.
170
Dan Barry, Looking for Answers, Finding One, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010,
at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/us/18land.html (describing the
impassioned questioning of former BP CEO Tony Hayward by Congressional
Representatives).
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Henry Fountain, Documents Show Risky Decisions Before BP Blowout, N.Y.
TIMES (June 14, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/science/earth/15rig.html
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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Id.
173
Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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The categorization of walruses as “sensitive biological resources” in need of
protection in the Gulf of Mexico is illustrative of this lackadaisical preparation:
walruses have not existed in the Gulf for over three million years. See Andrew C.
Revkin, A Series of Lapses Preceded Oil Gusher, N.Y. TIMES DOT EARTH BLOG (June 6,
2010, 9:08 AM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/06/a-series-of-lapsespreceded-oil-gusher (noting the inclusion of walruses in the BP’s Gulf oil-spill response
plan as an absurdity); Robert Mackey, Live Blogging Congressional Testimony From
Oil Executives, N.Y. TIMES LEDE BLOG (June 15, 2010, 11:36 AM),
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/15/live-blogging-oil-executives-in-congress/
(noting the pointed questioning regarding walruses from Rep. Markey, Chair of the
House Committee on Energy and Commerce, to BP executives).
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the disaster was ultimately avoidable.177 Specifically, the
commission’s report found that (1) mistakes, both
governmental and private, onshore and on the Deepwater
Horizon rig itself, increased the risk of a well blowout; (2) the
cumulative risk resulting from these decisions and actions was
as unreasonably large as it was foreseeable; and (3) the risk of
a catastrophic blowout manifested on April 20 and several of
the cited mistakes were contributing factors to the blowout.178
Ultimately, the disaster resulted from clear mistakes made in
the first instance by BP, Halliburton, and Transocean, and,
subsequently, by U.S. government officials. These officials,
relying heavily on the oil industry’s assertions regarding the
safety of their operations, failed to create and apply a program
of sufficient regulatory oversight to minimize the risks
associated with deepwater drilling.179
By mid-July 2010, BP’s incurred costs reached nearly $4
billion.180 Under pressure from the Obama administration,181 BP,
to compensate victims of the spill, pledged an additional $20
billion to an escrow account—an account administered by a BPappointed and Obama-administration-approved arbiter.182 As
late as February 2011, however, BP objected to the settlement
terms between the arbiter and victims, claiming that the terms
were too generous.183 Regardless of these costs, the ultimate cost
to restore the natural resources in the Gulf will be far higher.
In addition to the cleanup process,184 the NRDA process
has begun.185 NOAA coordinates with the Trustees per OPA
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Id. at 115.
179
Id. at 127.
180
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Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/06/18/us/18assess.html.
182
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Remarks to Panel, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2010, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/17/us/politics/17obama.html.
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Feb. 18, 2011, at A19, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/18/us/18bp.html.
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Cleanup to Take Years, Official Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/
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requirements.186 The Deepwater Horizon Trustees include the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the
DOI, the Department of Commerce, the Bureau of Land
Management, and designated state trustee agencies for the
states of Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.187
As of February 2011, NOAA is engaged in the preliminary
assessment phase.188 While both Trustees and RPs provide oilexposure data to the public, which hastens the restoration
process,189 “they reserve the right to withhold information from
[those] studies” in which either party contests the results.190
Withholding information is clearly inconsistent with standard
scientific investigation.191 The practice of withholding
http://www.restorethegulf.gov/sites/default/files/documents/pdf/framework-for-earlyrestoration-04212011.pdf.
186
15 C.F.R. § 990 (2010).
187
Matthew P. Coglianese, The Importance of Determining Potential Chronic
Natural Resource Damages from the Deepwater Horizon Accident, 40 ENVTL. L. REP.
NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,100, 11,101 (2010). Coglianese points out that “efforts to
understand chronic, sublethal, and cumulative effects have only begun.” Id. at 11,100.
He introduces the legal and regulatory framework that will allow the government to
hold parties responsible for the natural resource damage in the Gulf of Mexico. Id.
With regard to the current federal assessment, and the Damage Assessment,
Remediation, and Restoration Program (DAARP), “[i]ndependent researchers have
claimed that the ‘big money’ for NRDA research, access to information, and information
dissemination are controlled too tightly by the federal government and by BP.” Id. at
11,104. One researcher stated:
The problem is that researchers for BP and the government are kept quiet, and
their data is unavailable to the rest of the community. When damages to the
Gulf are assessed in court or Congress, there might not be enough objective
data to make a fair judgment. Transparency is vital to successful science:
researchers must subject their proposals to the scrutiny of colleagues, and
publications require peer review.
Id.
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SPILL RESTORATION: DAMAGE ASSESSMENT, REMEDIATION & RESTORATION PROGRAM,
http://www.gulfspillrestoration.noaa.gov/oil-spill/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2011); NRDA
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RESTORETHEGULF.GOV (Apr. 21, 2011, 12:05 PM), http://www.restorethegulf.gov/
release/2011/04/21/nrda-trustees-announce-1-billion-agreement-fund-early-gulf-coastrestoration-proj.
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Linda Hooper-Bui, Op-Ed, A Gulf Science Blackout, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24,
2010, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/opinion/25hooperBui.html (discussing the importance of transparency in scientific studies concerning
the spill as critical to a speedy restoration of the Gulf).
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Spill’s Impacts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/08/18/
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see also Amanda Mascarelli, Freedom of Spill Research Threatened: Scientists Call for
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NATURE NEWS (July 28, 2010), http://www.nature.com/news/2010/100728/full/466538a.html.
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Petersen, supra note 190 (Noting the importance of the withheld scientific
data, Tom Brosnan, an environmental scientist with NOAA, argues that “[t]his is a
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information stems from the myriad lawsuits the disaster
prompted192—much of the data will provide material support for
the Trustees’ and RPs’ legal strategies. These legal strategies
hinge on the retention of scientific expert witnesses193 (many of
whom also engage in the NRDA process), and result in the
systematic withholding of essential information. Only after the
NRDA restoration plan is approved, or litigation is exhausted,
will the parties disclose oil-exposure data.194 Paradoxically,
“[m]itigating the long term impact of the oil spill . . . require[s]
an open exchange of scientific data and analysis.”195 Keeping
such data confidential will likely result in delaying Gulf
restoration.196 As the BP case illustrates, in the Environmental
Era that is supposed to be collaborative, any move toward
cooperation is strained, at best.
III.

EPSTEIN’S NEW GOVERNANCE MODEL, GE, AND BP

This section applies Epstein’s modes of social control to
the GE and BP cases. The analysis in this section lays the
groundwork for the recommendations in Part IV, which
support the narrow goal of incentivizing cooperative NRDA and
affirming broader New Governance principles, especially
increased transparency and accountability.
In an open and democratic society, an engaged civil
society, working in tandem with a vigilant and responsible
media, is critical in highlighting unethical corporate behavior
and spurring change. These two modes are essential forms of
social control in both the GE and BP cases. In the GE case,
environmentalists’ engagement has pressured government

very pointed investigation into what has been injured, what has been lost and what is
required to compensate the public.”)
192
Id.; Robert B. Gagosian & Christopher F. D’Elia, Research on Gulf Oil Spill
Shouldn’t Take a Backseat to Litigation, WASH. POST (July 27, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/26/AR2010072604443.html
(discussing the link between filing lawsuits against BP and the withholding of scientific data).
193
See Gagosian & D’Elia, supra note 192. Stan Stenner, the director of
conservation science at the Ocean Conservancy, noted the typicality of hiring experts
following an ecological disaster. He explained that this is “par for the
course . . . . [a]nytime you have an event like this, everyone goes out and recruits
experts.” Petersen, supra note 190. Noting the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill in Alaska
and Exxon’s aggressive campaign to hire experts, Senner offered that the expert’s
“mission was not to find out what the harm was from the spill; their mission was to
cast doubt on any conclusions drawn about harm from the spill.” Id.
194
Gagosian & D’Elia, supra note 192.
195
Petersen, supra note 190.
196
Gagosian & D’Elia, supra note 192.
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actors to force GE’s cleanup and restoration.197 Scenic Hudson,
Friends of a Clean Hudson, New York Public Interest Research
Group, The Riverkeepers, and the local chapter of the Sierra
Club have been especially tenacious.198
The media, including the New York Times, have
exhibited both vigilance and responsibility in providing
information. Reporters exposed deficiencies in GE’s cleanup
and restoration efforts. Journalists have also been willing to
highlight GE’s illegal and unethical behavior,199 including GE’s
continually obstinate and adversarial behavior. For example,
GE launched a public relations campaign arguing “that the risk
of leaving PCBs in the silt was very low, while the cost of
dredging the contaminated bottom would be very high, possibly
costing as much as several hundred million dollars.”200 This
media campaign garnered some support, which meant that
some members of an engaged, albeit misinformed, civil society
stood with GE and wanted to prevent dredging.
Regarding BP, an engaged conglomeration of regional
elected officials,201 concerned citizens,202 environmentalists,203 and
myriad others spoke through a vigilant media to pressure BP
and government actors into mounting a transparent and
sustained cleanup effort. For example, concerned by a
“disinformation campaign” BP waged to underestimate the
impacts of the spill and the United States’ lethargic response to
it,204 James Carville, a former strategist for President Clinton
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See supra text accompanying note 121.
KAMIENIECKI, supra note 113, at 147.
199
Epstein, supra note 14.
200
KAMIENIECKI, supra note 113, at 147.
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See, e.g., Drew Jubera, ‘America’s Bubba’: Is Nungesser an Oil Folk Hero or an
Opportunist?, CNN (Aug. 3, 2010), http://www.cnn.com/2010/US/08/03/billy.nungesser.
oil.disaster/index.html (depicting Louisiana Plaqemines Parish President Billy Nungesser’s
zealous advocacy for his constituents). Historian Douglas Brinkley notes that
198
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strikes—he calls it the way he sees it. He’s able to go after BP and the Obama
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uncompromised man in Louisiana.
Id.
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Campbell Robertson, Scope and Pace of Gulf Cleanup Is Criticized, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2011, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/08/us/08spill.html
(detailing the efforts of individuals to keep the limelight on BP’s cleanup efforts).
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and current Gulf resident,205 famously challenged the Obama
administration on Good Morning America. He stated: “Man,
you got to get down here and take control of this! Put somebody
in charge of this thing and get this moving. We’re about to die
down here!”206 When making one of several appearances on
Anderson Cooper 360, Billy Nungesser, the combative Parish
President from Louisiana,207 illustrated the mutually reinforcing
nature of media and society. Recounting a conversation with
President Obama, Mr. Nungesser indicated that the White
House took note of Mr. Cooper’s vigilant presence and
broadcasts in the Gulf. Mr. Nungesser stated, “[The President]
made me commit and I agreed that, if we have the same messup in chain of command, or things not getting done, that I will
give him a call at the White House before I call you, Anderson.”208
Weeks later, Mr. Carville wrote an op-ed piece noting the muchimproved and vigorous government response:
We need our government to remain vigilant in addressing this. We need
a lot of research into the science of the effects of the spill. And in the
words of Interior Secretary Ken Salazar, we need to continue to have
the heel of our boot on the neck of BP. . . . [We] need to stay vigilant and
aggressive in being sure that the inevitable “It’s time to move on”
mentality does not set in. Trust me. The last thing we need to do is move
on until our precious coastline is both restored and renewed.209
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James Carville was chief strategist for Bill Clinton’s 1992 presidential
campaign. Carville is a resident of New Orleans, Louisiana, where he teaches political
science at Tulane University. Press Release, Tulane University, James Carville Joins
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Response,
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the Clinton campaigns and presidency, most notably, of course, the White House chief
of staff, Rahm Emanuel.”).
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Slams Obama’s Response to BP Oil Spill, ABC NEWS (May 26, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/
GMA/Politics/bp-oil-spill-political-headache-obama-democrats-slam/story?id=10746519.
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5, 2010), http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-05/opinion/carville.obama.bp_1_bp-disasterobama-administration-president-obama?_s=PM:OPINION.

2011]

COOPERATIVE NRDA & NEW GOVERNANCE

135

Mr. Carville also commended the President’s successful
negotiation with BP that resulted in a $20 billion fund to
compensate the spill’s victims.210
Accepting Mr. Carville’s overture, the White House sent
a copy of Mr. Carville’s essay to reporters.211 To this day, an
engaged civil society and a vigilant and responsible media,
working in tandem, continue to keep Gulf cleanup and
restoration issues in the limelight.
Law, the articulation of public policy enforced by
government,212 provided the foundation for environmentalists’
and journalists’ work in both the GE and BP cases. CERCLA,
as a mode of social control, was designed to address just the
kind of scenario the GE case presents213: to hold RPs
accountable for cleaning hazardous-waste areas and restoring
natural resources.214 But law is complex. GE’s adversarial
stance on cleanup and restoration is consistent with the
incentives built into CERCLA’s design.215 CERCLA, at its
foundation, assumes an adversarial relationship between
Trustees and RPs. Moreover, GE used law to delay its response
to the PCB discharges and to challenge the constitutionality of
CERCLA.216 Though that litigation strategy ultimately ended in
failure in 2010,217 legal mechanisms provided GE with the
opportunity to both deny its responsibility for polluting the
Hudson River and then defend its pollution for decades.
Similarly, law constitutes a necessary foundation to
restore the Gulf. Like CERCLA, Congress tailored OPA to
respond to the precise scenario the Deepwater Horizon incident
presents.218 Although OPA, in contrast to CERCLA,
incorporates “cooperation” in its text, the specter of litigation is
real. Consequently, restoration processes under OPA are best
described as adversarial. As mentioned, the RPs and Trustees
are now locked in a “battle of the experts”219 whereby both sides
210
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will rely on experts to prove their case. Trustees will attempt to
maximize financial damages and RPs will attempt to minimize
them.220 This predictable dynamic, which the systematic
withholding of scientific data compounds, all but eviscerates
the cooperative elements of OPA. Counterintuitively, these
“cooperative” efforts delay Gulf restoration.221 Legislative
changes to OPA that incentivize genuine cooperation may
change the dynamic between RPs and Trustees.222
Epstein’s three remaining modes—affinity group
regulation, self-regulation, and ethical precepts—did little to
harness responsible corporate behavior from GE or BP. Recall
that affinity group regulation refers to standards of behavior
established by members of a particular profession, such as
medicine.223 The case studies noted above evoke no sign of
professional influence. In the GE case, managers developed a
stonewalling strategy.224 In the BP case, managers decided how
the company would engage with Trustees and the public.
Management is a practice, not a profession.225 Management has
not yet formally recognized a duty to serve the greater good, nor
has management adopted an ethics code.226 Not surprisingly,
then, managers in the two industries considered here, electrical
manufacturing and oil, have not developed professional codes to
articulate how their work will consider the stakeholders’ needs.
Self-regulation is the voluntary adherence to standards
set by NGOs concerned with specific issues, such as climate
change.227 In the GE case, consider a scenario where Scenic
Hudson had created standards for hazardous-waste disposal
and GE had voluntarily complied with those standards in good
faith. This would have been an act of self-regulation. In the
real scenario, though, environmentalists seemed to know they
220
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More Ethical 2011, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.marketwatch.com/
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adopted and enforced codes of conduct. Id.
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were in for a long fight from the start.228 They did not seek
voluntary compliance with guidelines.
“Ethics” highlights beliefs derived from religion,
humanistic philosophy, social customs, mores, and traditions.229
Ethical precepts can harness excellence in corporate behavior.
Today, for instance, GE’s Ecomagination campaign inspires “the
brightest minds to collaborate, invest and innovate” in clean
energy.230 Although business interests necessarily provide the
primary foundation for the campaign, GE’s statements about
clean energy suggest that the company values the environment,
and that GE has an obligation to consider the needs of future
generations.231 These statements, at a minimum, reflect GE’s
ethical awareness. Unfortunately, GE’s Ecomagination is
entirely forward-looking: the plan disregards the Hudson River
disaster.232 In fact, GE’s restoration strategy is decidedly
unimaginative. From CERCLA’s passage, in 1980, to 2002, GE
stonewalled and continually avoided action that would restore
the natural resources the corporation damaged or destroyed.
Ironically, during the stonewalling years, Jack Welch’s
rationalizations for stall tactics were peppered with words that
hint at an awareness of CSR principles. In essence, he asserted
that GE was “doing the right thing” by doing nothing. Welch
stood his ground against natural resource restoration by stating
that he wanted the “truth” to win out.233 Regrettably, Welch’s
truth was that GE had a right to refrain from restoration
because PCBs were not harmful.234 After Welch retired in 2001,
GE’s new CEO, Jeffrey R. Immelt, changed strategies and

228

See supra notes 116-34 and accompanying text.
See Epstein, supra note 14, at 211-12.
230
Press, GE: ECOMAGINATION, http://206.155.64.41/news/press-page/#content
(last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
231
Id.
232
Although the company did agree to go ahead with Phase 2.
233
JACK WELCH & JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT 283 (2003)
(“But I take great pride . . . our people get up every morning all over the world and
compete like hell with absolute integrity . . . . [Our people] see no conflict between
taking on the world’s best, every day, all over the globe, giving 110 percent and more—
to compete and win and grow—and at the same time maintain an instinctive,
unbendable, commitment to absolute integrity in everything we do.”).
234
Id. at 283-94. Welch noted:
229

Nothing is more important than a company’s integrity . . . . It not only means
that people must abide by the letter and spirit of the law, it also means doing
the right thing and fighting for what you believe is right. . . . On PCBs, we’ve
assured ourselves that they are not harmful to our employees or our neighbors.
Id. at 284.
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moved towards ending the dispute.235 Perhaps as a more neutral
outsider, Immelt could see that the stonewalling would have to
end because it became clear that PCBs were, in fact, harmful.236
Self-regulation and ethical precepts were similarly
unhelpful modes of social control in BP’s case. Certain company
actions do suggest that BP has at times had self-regulation or
ethical precepts in mind. For example, under former BP CEO
John Browne, the company unveiled a new motto, “Beyond
Petroleum.” The motto accompanies an “insignia of a blooming
flower,” an image meant “to portray the company as
one . . . responsive to growing public concerns [regarding]
climate change.”237
Unfortunately, though, BP’s new motto and logo seem
more about marketing than responsible behavior. In reality, BP
“has a worse health, environment[,] and safety record than
many other major oil companies”;238 the Deepwater Horizon oil
spill is only the latest costly blunder in a larger series. The
company does not demonstrate the proactive stance inherent in
corporations that self-regulate and act ethically. Indeed, despite
a catalog of crises and near catastrophes in recent years, BP
demonstrates a chronic inability or unwillingness to learn from
its mistakes.239 Three incidents are especially significant.
In 2005, an explosion at a BP refinery in Texas City,
Texas, killed fourteen workers and injured many more.240 In its
investigation, the government discovered more than 300 safety
235

Revkin, supra note 106.
GE demonstrated an escalating commitment to a losing course of action. It
is possible GE decided to stick with its stance on PCBs because acknowledging that
PCBs are harmful would have made Welch’s initial decision seem incorrect or bad. See
LINDA K. TREVINO & KATHERINE A. NELSON, MANAGING BUSINESS ETHICS: STRAIGHT
TALK ABOUT HOW TO DO IT RIGHT 91 (5th ed. 2011) (discussing decision makers’
tendency to consider sunk costs in determining whether to escalate a commitment).
237
See Krauss, supra note 158.
238
Jad Mouawad, For BP, a History of Spills and Safety Lapses, N.Y. TIMES,
May 9, 2010, at A22, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/09/business/
09bp.html; see also Sarah Lyall, In BP’s Record, a History of Boldness and Costly
Blunders, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2010/07/13/business/energy-environment/13bprisk.html; Pierre Thomas et al., BP’s
Dismal Safety Record, ABC NEWS (May 27, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/WN/bpsdismal-safety-record/story?id=10763042.
239
Robbie Brown, Panel Presses BP on Its Safety Record, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27,
2010, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/27/us/27hearings.html (Noting
the serial safety violations in BP’s history, Capt. Hung Nguyen of the Coast Guard, who is
also part of a team of federal investigators questioning BP’s record, commented to BP
officials that “one dot is a point, two dots in a line, and three dots is a trend. . . . There’s a
trend there about the safety culture of BP. These things keep happening.”)
240
14 Die in Massive Explosion at Texas City Refinery, CLICK2HOUSTON (Mar.
23, 2005), http://www.click2houston.com/news/4311459/detail.html.
236
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violations,241 and BP agreed to pay $21 million in fines, which,
at the time, was an industry record.242 Telas Group, a consulting
firm contracted to examine conditions at the facility, reported
that they “ha[d] never seen a site where the notion ‘I could die
today’ was so real.”243 After inspectors from the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) revisited the Texas
City facility in 2009, they discovered more than seven hundred
safety violations and proposed a record fine of $87 million.244
OSHA stated that many of the penalties stemmed from BP’s
failure to meet its responsibilities under the previous Texas
City settlement.245 Ultimately, in August 2010, BP agreed to
pay $50 million to settle penalties for its failure to correct
safety issues between 2005 and 2009.246 This was another record
fine for the industry.247
In another incident, Thunder Horse, a platform in the
deepwater Gulf of Mexico, was vulnerable when Hurricane
Dennis passed over the platform in 2005.248 Thunder Horse, a
$1 billion crowning glory in deepwater-drilling technology,
listed (or tilted) precariously to one side and appeared to be
sinking.249 Investigations later revealed that a backwardsinstalled valve caused the vessel to flood, imperiling the project
before any oil was pumped.250
Finally, in 2006, a cracked BP oil pipeline in Alaska
forced one of the nation’s largest oil fields, Prudhoe Bay, to
shut down. BP was subsequently fined $20 million after
prosecutors demonstrated BP’s negligent maintenance of the
pipeline.251 Prudhoe Bay Oil Field remains vulnerable to an

241

Federal Contractor Misconduct Database: BP P.L.C. Workplace Safety Violations,
POGO.ORG, http://www.contractormisconduct.org/index.cfm/1,73,222,html?CaseID=387 (last
visited Sept. 30, 2011).
242
Id.
243
See Lyall, supra note 238.
244
See Elana Schor, Twin BP Disasters Complicate Push for Safety, N.Y.
TIMES (July 2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/07/02/02greenwire-twin-bpdisasters-complicate-push-for-safety-59116.html?pagewanted=all.
245
Id.
246
Steven Greenhouse, BP to Pay Record Fine for Refinery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13,
2010, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/13/business/13bp.html?gwh=
E44A44C76A9B69CEBAEBB3F5669BEE8D.
247
Id.
248
See Lyall, supra note 238.
249
Id.
250
Id.
251
See Krauss, supra note 158.
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accident that industry insiders believe could rival the
Deepwater Horizon spill.252
Given BP’s continuing struggle to comply with current
laws, there remains little to suggest that the company is capable
of adopting any heightened standard, whether derived from
NGOs or affinity groups (which have yet to exist). Moreover, BP’s
accident history makes unlikely the possibility that the company
will avail itself of any argument that it ought to behave ethically.
To date, Epstein’s final three modes have proven ineffective at
incentivizing BP to engage in responsible corporate behavior.253
As we think beyond GE and BP, it is useful to consider
what typically incentivizes positive corporate behavior.254
Generally, corporations with an international presence tend to
prefer reputation-saving self-regulation to government
intervention.255 GE and BP are exceptions to this generalization.
When thinking about Epstein’s modes of social control and New
Governance in general, these principles are best considered in
the context of a particular company’s history—its record of
success and failure, and its past responses to failure, in
particular.256 Although both GE and BP have resisted
government intervention and made attempts to create a
positive environmental reputation, any self-imposed strategies
have lacked substance. Further, for both companies, the stakes
of owning up to real problems are high. GE has several
Superfund sites waiting to be restored.257 Any self-imposed
regulation obligates the company to continue cleaning and
restoring with no limit to the corporate spending necessary to
become a solid environmental citizen.258 BP has already
252

The Spill: BP’s Vast Prudhoe Bay Oil Field, GLOBAL RES. TV (Oct. 26,
2010), http://tv.globalresearch.ca/2010/10/spill-bps-vast-prudhoe-bay-oil-field.
253
It is possible the ethics and self-regulation modes will work in the years ahead.
254
See supra note 47.
255
Kevin R. Jackson, Global Corporate Governance: Soft Law and Reputational
Accountability, 35 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 41, 48 (2010) (arguing “that corporate governance
must focus on the role of soft law in today’s global environment”); see also Simon
Chesterman, The Turn to Ethics: Disinvestment from Multinational Corporations for
Human Rights Violations—the Case of Norway’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, 23 AM. U. INT’L
L. REV. 577, 603 (2008) (proposing that international corporations prefer to engage in
voluntary compliance with labor and environmental standards).
256
Some companies can face an environmental disaster and it can serve as a
wake-up call to change the organization’s culture.
257
Gabriel Nelson, EPA Cleanup Tactic to Face GE Challenge in D.C. Circuit,
N.Y. TIMES (May 13, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/05/13/13greenwireepa-cleanup-tactic-to-face-ge-challenge-in-dc-69214.html?scp=7&sq=G.E.%20number%
20of%20Superfund%20sites&st=cse.
258
According to the EPA, GE is an RP in 52 Superfund sites in the country.
Revkin, supra note 106.
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invested so much in one particular strategy—aggressive cost
cutting combined with aggressive moves to increase market
share by capitalizing on its expertise in deepwater drilling—
that even the Deepwater Horizon disaster is unlikely to inspire
a major shift in corporate culture.
IV.

GETTING TO RESTORATION: LOOKING BEYOND THE
HUDSON AND GULF

Ideally, GE would have voluntarily assumed
responsibility to remedy natural-resource injuries in the
Hudson River. If GE voluntary engaged in cooperative NRDA,
this behavior would have demonstrated a commitment to New
Governance principles and, moreover, demonstrated corporate
integrity.259 GE needed the courage of its convictions in
sustainable value creation. The company waited too long to
demonstrate a commitment to using its “Ecomagination” and
resources to efficiently and sustainably restore the Hudson River.
Similarly, BP is poised for adversarial, rather than cooperative,
NRDA. The significance of BP’s decision to embrace adversarial
strategies is that doing so prevents Trustees and RPs from getting
to restoration. BP still has the power to demonstrate corporate
integrity and a commitment to New Governance principles.
Modeling a new approach would set an example for future work
in responding to environmental disasters.260
259

Integrity has these three characteristics: (1) One must take pains to try to
discern what is right or wrong; (2) One must be willing to shape one’s actions in accord with
that discernment, even when it is difficult or painful to do so; and (3) One must be willing to
acknowledge publicly what one is doing. STEPHEN L. CARTER, INTEGRITY 7 (1996).
260
For an excellent analysis of culture and accidents in the context of high
risk technology, see DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION: RISKY
TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE, AND DEVIANCE AT NASA (1996). Vaughan’s work is an
appropriate lens through which to consider reviews of the Deepwater Horizon disaster.
See NATIONAL COMMISSION, supra note 177. Also, CCRM Deepwater Horizon Study
Group concluded that “those who worked on the Deepwater Horizon Macondo well
project [failed to make] conscious ‘well informed’ decisions to trade safety for
money . . . . [T]here were perceived to be no downsides associated with the uncertain
thing.” Letter from Robert Bea, Professor, Ctr. for Catastrophic Risk Mgmt. Deepwater
Horizon Study Grp., to Nat’l Comm’n on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill &
Offshore Drilling 1 (Nov. 24, 2010), available at http://www.eoearth.org/
article/Deepwater_Horizon_study_group?topic=50364. The Study Group explains that
[t]he Macondo well permitting documentation clearly shows that both BP and
the MMS believed the likelihood of a catastrophic blowout were not
significant . . . . [A]n organization’s safety culture takes time (several decades)
to develop and has to be grown from within . . . . [A]t the time of the Macondo
blowout, BP’s corporate culture remained one that was embedded in risk taking
and cost-cutting . . . . Cultural influences that permeate an organization and an
industry and manifest in actions that can either promote and nurture a high
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The following section provides three concrete
recommendations to make cooperative NRDA more likely. The
first addresses cooperative NRDA directly. The second and third
suggestions affirm broader New Governance principles. All three
recommendations, however, rely on New Governance theory.
A.

Recommendation One: Amend CERCLA and OPA to
Incentivize Cooperation

Scientists and policymakers who advocate cooperative
NRDA generally see OPA’s statutory language as superior to
CERCLA’s because OPA incorporates the concept of
“cooperation” in more than one provision of the statute.261
Fundamentally, however, both CERCLA and OPA assume that
decisions about NRDA and restoration will likely be made
through, or as a consequence of, litigation. As mentioned, while
both Trustees and RPs provide scientific data to the public,
they reserve the right to withhold information from studies in
which either party contests the results.262 This practice results
in the systematic withholding of data until litigation is
exhausted. Consequently, restoration is delayed.263 Since NRDA
takes place in the context of litigation as the default disputesettling mechanism,264 the end game is still defined by victory
for the opposing party, no matter the gloss of civility that
opposing sides create during the NRDA process. That is, the
cleanup and restoration of injured natural resources is not the
primary motivation: attorneys dominate and control the NRDA

reliability organization with highly reliable systems, or actions reflective of
complacency, excessive risk-taking, and a loss of situational awareness.
Id. app. A at 7 & 9.
Insularity is an additional culture problem. “[I]ll-advised [corporate]
strategies are often the result of a company dialogue restricted to a narrow group of
individuals who confer only with each other.” Peter Firestein, Insularity: The Hidden
Killer of Corporate Reputation: BP Has Paid Dearly for Failure to See Its Actions in the
Context of Broad Social Interests, BLOOMBERG BUS. WK. (Sept. 7, 2010, 3:51 PM),
http://www.businessweek.com/managing/content/sep2010/ca2010092_593603.htm.
261
For example, OPA mandates citizens’ councils for Prince William Sound
and Cook Inlet. These councils are designed to promote partnership and cooperation
among local citizens, industry, and government. See Introduction, PRINCE WILLIAM
SOUND REG’L CITIZENS’ ADVISORY COUNCIL, http://www.pwsrcac.org/about/index.html
(last updated July 14, 2011).
262
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
263
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
264
See Franklin D. Strier, Major Problems Endemic to the Adversary System
and Proposed Reforms, 19 W. ST. U. L. REV. 463, 464 (1992).
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process.265 Partisan advocates are supposed to be diligent,
productive contributors to finding the truth. However, scholars
who study the costs and benefits of an adversarial system have
established defects in the truth-finding process; most notably,
lawyers hell-bent on victory are not incentivized to aid the
court in discovering all the facts.266
Attorneys influence both Trustees and RPs,267 which
means that both sides are incentivized to consider factors other
than reaching restoration. Certainly, RPs are concerned with
costs, and are therefore encouraged to use adversarial flaws to
gain the lowest judgment possible. But Trustees are also equally
vulnerable to flaws in the adversarial system. For example,
Trustees are not clearly bound by fiduciary duties268 to protect
natural resources even if that means revealing the complete
truth (e.g., that some natural resources have not, in fact, been
harmed by a hazardous release). Given the disincentives of
seeking justice through the adversarial system, there is no
wonder that critics of the current NRDA process blame its
defects on dueling lawyers and their expert scientists, who
demonstrate considerable skill at generating evidence with a
particular objective in mind—a favorable outcome for the client.
One significant change to both CERCLA and OPA would
set the stage to get to restoration faster and more efficiently.
Congress, or the EPA in its regulatory capacity, should move
the locus of control269 in evidence-gathering to a judge or other
neutral party, rather than an attorney.270 Under this system, a
265

See Nicholas J. Lund & Niki L. Pace, Deepwater Horizon Natural Resource
Damages Assessment: Where Does the Money Go?, 16 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 327, 35153 (2011) (describing how lawyers are involved in the NRDA process (e.g., Trustees
often retain outside legal counsel)).
266
See Strier, supra note 264, at 482.
267
In fact, Trustees and corporate executives are likely to be attorneys.
268
See generally Laura Rowley, NRD Trustees: To What Extent Are They Truly
Trustees, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 459 (2001).
269
Strier, supra note 264, at 466.
270
Another neutral party would be an arbitrator. Alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) is another avenue that could lead to more effective NRDA. See Sarah
L. Inderbitzin, Nicholas Targ, Jamles L. Byrnes & Bruce A. Johnson, The Use of
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Natural Resource Damage Assessments?, 20 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 28-29, 31 (1995). Inderbitzin, Targ, Byrnes, and
Johnson urge agencies to use alternative dispute resolution, or ADR, when conducting
assessments, especially to “reduce the amount of money spent on data collection,
increase the data’s acceptability, and reduce litigation.” Id. at 28. These scholars
emphasize the value of non-adversarial approaches to NRDA.
Other authors have suggested statutory change. For example, Klyza and
Sousa state generally, that “[w]ithout statutory changes to protect . . . collaborative
experiments, they will often be vulnerable in a political system that offers many points
of access, many points of attack.” KLYZA & SOUSA, supra note 32, at 8.
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judge or other neutral party would oversee (1) the selection of
an independent panel of scientists to engage in NRDA and (2)
the approval of a defined budget for the NRDA process. In
other words, from the beginning, an objective party would set
the parameters of the NRDA process. Shifting control from
dueling attorneys to a process with judicial oversight supports
the classic both-and agenda: it would achieve substantive
improvements in environmental protection and accommodate
all stakeholders’ legitimate concerns in the economic and social
costs of implementing both CERCLA and OPA.271
B.

Recommendation Two: Consider Science as a Mode of
Social Control in New Governance Frameworks

Science, similar to vigilant and responsible media, could
serve as a mode of social control to encourage positive corporate
behavior.272 As Jane Lubchenco has stated, “[O]ne of the most
important roles of science is to inform, to provide information,
so that decision makers can take that information into
consideration and understand the full ramifications of a course
of action.”273 Science as a mode of social control, used alone or in
tandem with other modes, could incent ethical behavior by
offering factual truth—truth that informs the public about the
consequences of corporate behavior. Considering science as a
mode of social control is consistent with the historical view of
science as a producer of reliable knowledge.
The role of science in society historically focused on the
production of “reliable knowledge” toward understanding the
world and solving practical problems.274 According to
Lubchenco, the relationship between science and society is
predicated upon an unwritten social contract—a commitment
that scientists will not only create new knowledge but also
communicate knowledge broadly so citizens and policymakers
271

See Patrick E. Tolan, Jr., Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA:
Failures, Lessons Learned, and Alternatives, 38 N.M. L. REV. 409 (2008) (exploring
NRD litigation, alternatives to litigation, and corrective action that would allow NRD
to realize its potential). Tolan sees tremendous promise in the idea of cooperative
NRDA, but suggests that regulatory and legislative changes are necessary to set the
stage for increased cooperation. Id. at 452.
272
See Jane Lubchenco, Earth’s Unruly Tenant, OPEN SPACES,
http://www.open-spaces.com/article-v2n1-lubchenco.php/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
273
Id. Dr. Jane Lubchenco currently serves as the Under Secretary for Oceans
and Atmosphere and Administrator of NOAA.
274
Michael Gibbons, Science’s New Social Contract with Society, 402 NATURE
C81, C84 (1999).
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can use the knowledge to make informed decisions.275
Importantly, the form of research Lubchenco had in mind
assumes that research will stay true to the ideals of inquiry,
rather than advocacy.
Some scholars distinguish the “plain-and-simple
inquirer” from the “advocacy researcher” and suggest that
individuals view these two types of truth seekers as two
extremes of a continuum.276 The inquirer seeks all evidence, looks
for answers, and finds answers, no matter what the answers
turn out to be. The inquirer is likely to generate reliable
evidence.277 The advocacy researcher, by contrast, may “minimize
the importance of unfavorable evidence he/she can ignore or
explain away.”278 In other words, “[S]cientific work can be
distorted and impeded when it gets entangled with litigation.”279
Advocacy research is inconsistent with disinterested research.
Indeed, advocacy research is much more likely to be biased.280
Consequently, advocacy research is often termed “lawsuit
science,” “junk science,” or “litigation-driven science.”281 Any
research “skewed by the desire to advance one side in litigation”
raises legitimate issues of scientific integrity.282
Federal Rules of Evidence283 and state equivalents284 give
courts the power to appoint experts at their discretion. In other
275

Lubchenco, supra note 272; see also Jane Lubchenco, Entering the Century
of the Environment: A New Social Contract for Science, 279 SCI. 491, 494-95 (1998).
276
Susan Haack, What’s Wrong with Litigation-Driven Science? An Essay in
Legal Epistemology, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1053, 1072, 1074 (2008).
277
For more background on what “reliable” evidence means, see Ryan
Hackney, Flipping Daubert: Putting Climate Change Defendants in the Hot Seat, 40
ENVTL. L. 255 (2010).
278
Haack, supra note 276, at 1070, 1072.
279
Id. at 1056.
280
Id. at 1075. Haack writes: “To describe research as ‘litigation-driven’ may
mean either (a) that the need for this work arises out of litigation, or (b) that the work
is undertaken for the purpose of finding evidence favoring one side in litigation, and
explaining away or otherwise playing down evidence favoring the other side.” Id.
281
See id.; see also Danielle Marie Stager, Comment, From Kepone to Exxon
Valdez Oil and Beyond: An Overview of Natural Resource Damage Assessment, 29 U.
RICH. L. REV. 751, 753 (1995) (focusing on environmental damage assessment,
including the “emergence of litigation-driven science following the Exxon Valdez oil
spill”). Stager noted that the Exxon Valdez litigation featured lawyers “in all post-spill
activities,” which influenced the NRDA process. Id. at 785. Scientists raised concerns
about the legitimacy of research generated by scientists Exxon hired—research the
state of Alaska sealed. Additionally, evidence gathered by government actors was
sealed. Stager pointed out that sealed evidence not only erodes public trust, but also
adversely affects emerging oil spill law. Id. at 786.
282
Haack, supra note 276, at 1081.
283
Keum J. Park, Note, Judicial Utilization of Scientific Evidence in Complex
Environmental Torts: Redefining Litigation Driven Research, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
483, 502-03 (1996).
284
Id.
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words, judges are not required to rely on experts presented by
adversarial parties. For example, the Court-Appointed Scientific
Experts Project of the American Academy for the Advancement
of Science aids in the process of determining the truth.285 As the
previous recommendation indicates, courts should convene
independent panels of scientists to conduct the research needed
to get to restoration effectively and efficiently. Together, these
first two recommendations repair fundamental flaws in both
CERCLA and OPA implementation, as both statutes currently
incentivize Trustees and RPs to prepare for court battle.286
C.

Recommendation Three: Increase Corporate Disclosure
Requirements

Investors and consumers expect voluntary corporate
disclosures about both environmental performance and green
initiatives. These disclosures should be clear, accurate, and
complete. Moreover, these disclosures should be internally
consistent. For example, when BP ranks number twenty-five in
the top 100 “toxic companies”287 while touting its commitment to
sustainability, BP ought to explain this apparent inconsistency.
New Governance principles provide guidance to remove these
inconsistencies. In particular, ethical precepts require clear,
accurate, and complete disclosure. When corporate actors fail to
“walk the talk,” a vigilant and responsible media is likely to offer
the transparency that corporations fail to provide. When
patterns of secrecy and inconsistency become clear, investors
and consumers act. In response, they expect state and federal
legislators and regulators to intervene on their behalf.
Legal scholars should urge the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) and Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
to articulate and enforce public policy via laws and regulations
that (1) prevent deception and unfairness in the marketplace288

285

AM. ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCI., COURT APPOINTED SCIENTIFIC
EXPERTS: A HANDBOOK FOR EXPERTS (2002), available at http://www.aaas.org/
spp/case/handbookv2.pdf.
286
Ian Yarett, Weird Science, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 30, 2010, 10:00 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2010/08/30/is-research-into-the-oil-spill-s-impactskewed.html; see also Gagosian & D’Elia, supra note 192.
287
Toxic 100 Air Polluters, POL. ECON. RES. INST. (Mar. 2010),
http://www.peri.umass.edu/toxic_index/.
288
See Elizabeth K. Coppolecchia, Note, The Greenwashing Deluge: Who Will
Rise Above the Waters of Deceptive Advertising?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1353 (2010)
(considering regulation and litigation in response to greenwashing claims).
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and (2) encourage informed investment decisions.289 The FTC
already guides marketers to refrain from using general terms
such as “environmentally-friendly.”290 Currently, the FTC is
proposing guidelines to marketers that want to use product
certifications and seals of approval.291 The FTC’s proposed
regulations make clear that marketers cannot deceive
consumers by implying that an independent third party
certifies their products.292 The FTC gives an example. If a
company that places a label (a “GreenLogo for Environmental
Excellence,” for instance) on a product, that company may
mislead consumers to believe that an independent third party
awarded the seal.293 In short, the FTC may provide effective
tools to regulate transparency in corporations’ environmental
policies. Unfortunately, the FTC’s power in this space does not
extend beyond product marketing.
The SEC also requires accurate disclosure. The SEC
asks companies to disclose material information to potential
investors.294 When companies file reports with the SEC, they
must include accurate information on environmental risks and
liabilities.295 Generally, though, public companies have not been
forthcoming about environmental risks.296

289

Mehri, Giampetro-Meyer & Runnels, supra note 18, at 413; see also Adam
Sulkowski & Steven White, Financial Performance, Pollution Measures and the
Propensity to Use Corporate Responsibility Reporting: Implications for Business and Legal
Scholarship, 21 COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 491 (2010) (describing the history of
regulation by disclosure and corporate responsibility reporting, and determining the
impact that financial and environmental variables have on whether or not a company
utilizes corporate responsibility reporting); Cynthia A. Williams, The Geopolitical
Significance of Petroleum Corporations: Civil Society Initiatives and “Soft Law” in the Oil
and Gas Industry, 36 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 457 (2004) (describing additional reporting
mechanisms, including the Global Reporting Initiative, the Voluntary Principles on
Security and Human Rights, and the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative).
290
See Coppolecchia, supra note 288, at 1378.
291
Rick Romell, Lawsuit Targets S.C. Johnson’s ‘Green’ Labeling, MILWAUKEE
J. SENTINEL (Feb. 9, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/business/115613414.html.
292
Id.
293
Currently, consumers are challenging S.C. Johnson’s labeling. In particular,
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Currently, investor organizations and researchers are
asking for increased transparency from corporations.297 In
essence, they expect the SEC to improve monitoring compliance
with environmental disclosure requirements.298 The SarbanesOxley Act empowers regulators to increase expectations of
corporations with regard to transparency, including
transparency about environmental information.299 In particular,
companies should inform investors and the public about all
environmental risks: for GE, transparency in the Hudson’s PCB
dredging; for BP, transparency in the cleanup and restoration of
natural resources in the Gulf. For companies beyond GE and
BP, this might include transparency in how a particular
company plans to prevent environmental disasters and how the
company would act should it face an environmental crisis.
CONCLUSION
Considerations regarding the role and place of nature in
human life are more important today than ever before.300 RPs
have a duty to safeguard the corporation’s welfare—which
obligates them to balance the multiple, and sometimes
conflicting, claims of stakeholders, including shareholders,
employees, and residents of local communities. Trustees have a
duty to act on behalf of the public, restoring, rehabilitating,
replacing, or acquiring the equivalent of injured resources and
services after releases of pollutants. As a society, we have made
considerable progress in environmental protection by asking
government regulators to command and control. More recently,
a wide range of stakeholders have asked for more collaborative,
cooperative approaches that are flexible enough to respond to
the particular facts of an environmental situation.
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Lubchenco, supra note 272, writes:

We are beginning to understand that human health is an environmental issue,
that social justice is an environmental issue, that the economy is in reality an
environmental issue, and even national security is an environmental issue. As
we begin to appreciate the fundamental ways that humans are dependent upon
the functioning of intact ecological systems of the planet, we realize that those
systems provide not only goods but the services that collectively are our life
support systems. These life support systems determine our health, our
economies and our future in ways we are only beginning to appreciate.
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In NRDA specifically, the promise of cooperative NRDA—
expedited processes with reduced overall costs and improved
solutions—has yet to be realized. Flaws in the law and the limited
usefulness of other avenues of social control have created hurdles.
Hurdles include litigious railroading, lack of neutral scientific
information, and weak disclosure requirements. These hurdles
have impeded effective collaboration and, in turn, delayed New
Governance principles from taking complete effect.
We expect little debate about whether cooperative
NRDA and New Governance are worthwhile ideas. We do,
however, expect arguments over the solutions we have
suggested: (1) reforming CERCLA and OPA to incentivize
cooperation, (2) reframing science as a mode of social control,
and (3) increasing corporate disclosure requirements. These
recommendations change the status quo, and change is difficult
even when necessary. By putting a stop to feuding between RPs
and Trustees, insisting on neutral science that inspires better
behavior, and asking companies to demonstrate more
transparency, RPs and Trustees will be poised to comply with
their duties and meet their responsibilities to get to restoration
in U.S. waterways. Moreover, the recommendations we suggest
support corporate behavior that is environmentally and socially
responsible.

